Implementation status

Report date: 2026-10-19 (UTC). Everything below was verified by running it; anything not listed as verified should be treated as untested.

Implemented and tested

Area	What exists	Verification
Ohge Guard program	Vault PDA as token authority; policy (assets, limits, venues, adapters, window, slippage, reference requirement, freshness, confidence, drawdown); session register/revoke; pause/resume; deposit/withdraw; `execute_orca_swap` with every rule enforced atomically around one Whirlpool `swap` CPI; `trip_breaker` and `rebase_hwm`; events.	`anchor build` with Anchor 1.0.2; 27 of 27 tests pass on `solana-test-validator` with the real Orca program, the mainnet SOL/USDC pool and the Pyth SOL/USD + USDC/USD accounts cloned from mainnet-beta (`onchain/tests/ohge_guard.ts`, 33 s).
Adversarial coverage	Non-owner policy change, session cannot withdraw/set policy/pause/register/revoke/re-base, Token-2022 mint rejected, past/over-long expiries, replayed nonce, stale policy version, expired and over-long intents, unknown adapter, stranger authority, venue/mint/adapter not allowed, per-trade and per-window limits, concurrent intents (two at once, same nonce twice), venue cannot deliver min_out (no state change), reference floor, missing/substituted/mismatched price accounts, stale price, wide confidence, pause blocks trades while withdrawals work, destination substitution, revoked and expired sessions, drawdown fail-closed until re-base, valuation accounts required, breaker trip after real fee losses, withdrawals while tripped, full deposit → session → trade → revoke → withdraw flow.	Same suite.
Real swaps	Session-signed SOL→USDC and owner-signed USDC→SOL swaps executed through the guard on the cloned mainnet pool, balance deltas and the `TradeExecuted` event decoded from the confirmed transaction.	Same suite.
TypeScript mirrors	Pyth decoding and the exact integer math of the program, tick-array and oracle PDAs (checked against mainnet addresses), wallet sign-in (nonce, domain, replay, tampering), job queue (dedupe, per-vault serialisation, backoff), rebalancing candidate and intent validation, intent schema.	`pnpm test`: 17 Vitest tests pass.
Web app	Landing (3D scene with static/reduced-motion/WebGL fallbacks), dashboard routes `/app`, `/app/setup`, `/app/rules`, `/app/agent`, `/app/activity`, `/app/settings`, `/docs/*`, API routes, CSP and security headers.	`pnpm typecheck` clean; `pnpm lint` (0 errors); `pnpm build` ok; `pnpm smoke` against the production server: 64 of 64 checks pass (headless Chrome at desktop, phone and reduced-motion widths, console-error free; screenshots in `smoke-out/`).
Worker	Durable PostgreSQL job queue, heartbeat, scheduling of proposals, reconcile pass, execution path with simulation, signer abstraction (`local-file` encrypted at rest, `remote-http`).	`pnpm worker:once` against the embedded PostgreSQL (reconcile job processed, heartbeat visible in `/api/status`).

Deployment (2026-10-20)

Web: https://ohge.vercel.app (Vercel team flow3515, project ohge, CLI upload, no git), devnet build, CSP + security headers on. NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL pinned to the alias.
Database: Neon Postgres ohge-db created through the Vercel integration (us-east-1); migrations applied from the operator machine with the direct (unpooled) URL; AUTO_MIGRATE=0 in production.
Agent worker: Docker container ohge-worker on the operator VPS (deploy/Dockerfile.worker, deploy/docker-compose.vps.yml), same database, local-file signer with an encrypted volume, Anthropic provider (Claude Opus 5.5). The live /api/status shows its heartbeat. Because the web host holds no signing material, session keys are minted by the worker through a create_session_key job (the UI polls until the key appears); this path is implemented and type-checked but has not yet been exercised with a signed-in wallet.
Devnet program deployed (2026-10-20): 3Qxczmd9oWJre9ZERhkBjXjCdkQueuCoXQALivnzkM45 (upgrade authority = deployer 2GPNXtm59nBbLLCL1r8HokwGeKVaoJARQX5kkqdmkZsu, deployed with solana program deploy from the Anchor container after the faucet funded it). Site and worker run with that id.
Devnet journey verified on the public cluster with scripts/devnet-flow.mts (owner = the deployer key, session = a throwaway key): vault 8scrd54rextrwLSaSU8whBGuhQ4DfofW2qxnd4tYukm7, set_policy 5P6hXrS4…, deposit 2RjDpjKY…, register_session 2TsLrRig…, execute_orca_swap signed by the session key `4TG8JEuABKg8fFKnBErHbBaah1M8aukFnvzQyNT4SoExAZ7RqxmaxJHGaBCpvhUiiE4evnCnEYLb5iDqqtZ9pxaw` (0.01 SOL → 0.221939 devUSDC on the Orca devnet pool, TradeExecuted decoded from the confirmed transaction), replay rejected (nonce), revoke 33cMEFBu…, withdraw WSOL 5s5YDTav… and devUSDC 3ybDEbGN…; vault empty afterwards. The same transactions were recorded through the live API after a wallet sign-in and appear on the landing page and in Activity.
Still untested with a browser wallet extension: the dashboard clicks themselves (Phantom/Solflare signing). The instructions they send are the ones exercised above.

Landing data and token block (2026-10-20)

The landing page shows live reads only: Pyth SOL/USD and USDC/USD from mainnet and devnet, the Orca pool spot prices, a sample policy check (0.1 SOL at 1% slippage) computed with the program's integer arithmetic, the control-room status (program, worker heartbeat, signer, database, counts) and the latest confirmed executions decoded from their transactions (/api/public/landing, cached 20 s). The order animation in the room remains decorative and is labelled as such; the demonstration pause button is gone and the room dims when the worker is really offline.
$OHGE token block: published 2026-10-20 — 8dksc1aUPP1hCE3Ru2oNiEtXgQvTmmP6WwdHXqd5pump on mainnet-beta, verified on chain as a Token-2022 mint named "Ohge" (OHGE), 6 decimals, 1,000,000,000 supply, no mint authority; acquire link pump.fun. config/token.json holds it. pnpm token:ca <mint> [--network=…] [--acquire=<url>] verifies the mint on chain (decimals, supply, authority, Metaplex name) and ships; pnpm token:ca soon reverts.
Domain: https://ohgesol.xyz (bought on Vercel by the owner; apex canonical, www and *.vercel.app redirect to it). X: https://x.com/OhgeAI.

Network used for verification

Local solana-test-validator with mainnet-beta state cloned at startup (program, pool, tick arrays, Pyth accounts). The program keypair 3Qxczmd9oWJre9ZERhkBjXjCdkQueuCoXQALivnzkM45 is the one the tests deploy locally.

Not yet done or not exercised

Devnet deployment: prepared (deployer 2GPNXtm59nBbLLCL1r8HokwGeKVaoJARQX5kkqdmkZsu, build artifacts on the build host) but not performed: the devnet faucet refused airdrops from both available IPs on 2026-10-19. Fund the deployer with about 3 devnet SOL and run anchor deploy --provider.cluster devnet from onchain/, then set NEXT_PUBLIC_GUARD_PROGRAM_ID_DEVNET / GUARD_PROGRAM_ID.
End-to-end wallet journey on devnet (Phantom/Solflare signing in the browser, deposit, policy, session, trade, withdraw) could therefore not be run against a public cluster; the same instructions are exercised by the on-chain suite and the browser flows were smoke-tested without a wallet extension.
LLM providers: Anthropic (structured output, Claude Opus 5.5 by default) and OpenAI-compatible adapters are implemented but were not called with live keys; the scripted provider ran.
Remote signer (remote-http): implemented, untested against a real service.
Mainnet: not deployed, not assessed, no audit. The program and the app are unaudited.

External services still requiring configuration

DATABASE_URL (PostgreSQL), SESSION_SECRET, LLM_PROVIDER + key, SIGNER_PROVIDER (+ OHGE_SIGNER_KEY or remote signer URL/token), RPC endpoints (SOLANA_RPC_URL for the server/worker), the deployed program id per network, and a host for the long-running worker.

Unsupported features

Leverage, lending, perps, bridging, arbitrary transfers by the agent, aggregator-routed swaps, Token-2022 assets, multiple concurrent sessions, portfolio-allocation limits enforced onchain (bands are an off-chain strategy parameter), reference-price protection for markets without a Pyth feed (shown as unsupported).

Remaining review and audit requirements

Independent security audit of onchain/programs/ohge_guard (arithmetic, account validation, CPI surface, breaker semantics).
Review of the worker's operational controls (key handling, RPC failure modes, restart recovery) in the target hosting environment.
A production signer (HSM/KMS) and an operations runbook before any mainnet use.